That’s how we set our strategies and our strategic plans, et cetera. So that’s why the long-term guidance hasn’t changed. What we need to do is perform better within that long-term guidance range, in particular, more consistently. And also, and this links a bit to Warren’s point the quality of the growth has to be higher and we get a higher element of volume growth, which in called out within his action plan. So hopefully, that sort of squares the circle for you there.
Jemma Spalton: Our next question comes from James Edward Jones at RBC. James, please go ahead.
James Edwardes Jones: Yes. Thank you very much. So similar to Bruno’s question really, I was struck by the way you talked about competitive buying as a driver of gross margin improvement. And what were you doing before? This feels like a really basic thing, and I wonder if it’s symptomatic of some of what we’ve heard this morning. I suppose I want to understand if Unilever was actually a rather more dysfunctional state than might have been obvious from the outside. So if there’s greater upside than we realized by stopping doing things badly. And the second question, I guess, is you said there will be no transformational acquisitions. What about transformational disposals? Will you consider splitting the group up if the food business doesn’t improve its performance?
Hein Schumacher: First of all, on buying, and I would like to put it in a bigger context of improving our gross margin and we tend to talk about gross margin pretty much from a top line perspective, driving better mix and so forth. But I’m renewing a significant emphasis on the cost and on the productivity side in the next two years over the plan period. And that means that we’re basically going to work all three levers. And that, for me, includes buying, logistics and distribution and the manufacturing side through network improvements. Now if you think about buying where the main upside sits, and this is something that I’m seeing happening today, it’s the new organization structure that we have implemented allows for a significant amount of complexity reduction.
If you think about it, think of a business group like Home Care, who is really looking at it through a lens of the big power brands, the Dirt is Good brands, for example, and saying, okay, how many variants do we need? Can we eliminate complexity? can we scale down the number of ingredients? And I think all of the business groups are essentially finding out that there is opportunity to leverage our scale significantly better. So, that’s, I think, where we see a critical upside, but the same goes for network. When you look at it through a very specialist lens of in a business group to say, hey, liquid shipping is, of course, much more expensive then powder shipping, just to give you one example. So in some cases, you want to bring the factories a bit closer to where the market is, in some cases, you want to have a bit more distance.
Optimizing around that, I feel, is gaining a lot of momentum, and that’s where I see significant upside. But it is all about expediting it and executing these plans well. I see them coming through, and that’s what we’re going to work on. The ask that we have, as we said, was an expected restructuring that we will execute on a year-on-year basis of roughly 1% of turnover. Your second question on large-scale M&A. Look, at this moment, and I think I’ve laid it out, we see the biggest value creation opportunity in operating our current businesses very well. And that’s why we’ve laid out the action plan of today. Is that portfolio forever? Look, the situation is dynamic. Things can always change at some point in time. But I believe that the current — the value creation opportunity that is on the table is really to improve our business that we have while we continue to optimize the portfolio in — like we’ve done in the last two to three years or so.
Jemma Spalton: Next question comes from Tom Skykes at Deutsche. Go ahead, Tom.
Tom Sykes: Thank you. Good morning, everybody. Just going back to the points on rebooting the culture within the business, how opaque was the performance management before of the top 400 managers. And how differentiated will be bonus and pay remuneration be now compared to how it was before and when you look at the senior management team, I appreciate that there’s an external Chairman. And obviously, congratulations to everybody who has moved into new positions, but you’re coming back into the business and there’s obviously largely internal appointee. So why not try and reboot the culture more by bringing in more external influence? And is there anything in the HR, IT systems that you think just provides a kind of natural level of inertia to changing the performance culture?
And then briefly, just on you mentioned the product superiority was 70% that you have a broader level of criteria to measure that now. When you say there’s obviously the disconnect between the 70% product superiority and the competitiveness at 38. So looking at it another way, what percentage of your portfolio do you think is fit for purpose to improve the competitiveness and where do you need to get to, please?
Hein Schumacher: Thanks, Tom. There were quite a number of questions. So let me go through them, but please remind me if I miss something. So I think your first question is a topic that’s very close to my heart, and I’m very passionate about, which is as you call it, we boot culture, but essentially to dial up the performance culture. And as I said, actually before and one of the questions is, I mean, shaping our performance culture is not just saying, okay, now we need to perform. And that is — as you said, that is a very disciplined and concerted number of actions to take, and I’m very excited about the opportunities there. It starts with setting very clear priorities. It starts with setting very clear and stretching goals.
