Revenues were $162 million in the quarter. As in 3Q, on average, we exited positions at or above our marks. Credit loss expenses were negligible in the quarter, now that the majority of the NCL book is accounted for at fair value. Notably, underlying OpEx was down 9% as we continue to reduce headcount. Integration-related expenses of $749 million consisted mainly of real estate impairment charges. Moving to CET1 capital and RWA on slide 13. Our capital position remains strong, with capital ratios comfortably above our guidance and regulatory requirements. The CET1 capital ratio improved 10 basis points to 14.5%, as the negative impacts from the reported loss and dividend accruals were more than offset by RWA reductions ex-FX and a net write-up of temporary difference DTAs. Both CET1 capital and RWAs were significantly impacted by currency translation, which broadly offset each other in the CET1 capital ratio.
Currency translation effects also accounted for more of the $80 billion increase in LRD this quarter. We also retained higher HQLA to underpin increased deposit balances and to address the new Swiss liquidity requirements that just took effect. I will return shortly to comment on how we’re thinking more broadly about capital, liquidity and funding as we work towards delivering our financial ambitions by the end of 2026. Let me also briefly touch on a few reporting changes we are implementing from the first quarter of 2024. First, we are transferring the high net worth client segment from the Swiss Bank of Credit Suisse to Global Wealth Management to best meet our clients’ needs and align them with the global economy. These clients represent an estimated $60 billion in invested assets and $550 million in annual revenues.
Second, and as I highlighted last quarter, we are pushing out to our business divisions substantially all balance sheet, equity and P&L items that were previously retained centrally. We will restate 2023 to ensure comparability and publish an updated time series ahead of 1Q results. With that, I’ll hand back to Sergio for the investor update.
Sergio Ermotti: Thank you, Todd. For more than a decade, UBS has stood out among its GSIB peers for its favorable mix of businesses and unique model. Our global asset gathering operation and Swiss Universal Bank are at the core of our strategy and they are complemented by our capital-light Investment Bank. Since 2012, our ambition to be the world’s leading global wealth manager has served us well, allowing us to generate over $50 billion in capital for shareholders through the end of 2022, while also investing in sustainable long-term growth. The Credit Suisse deal accelerates our strategy. We are the only truly global wealth manager with nearly $4 trillion in invested assets across a client franchise that would be nearly impossible to replicate.
Globally, GWM clients benefit from our unparalleled advice, products and services. We are the number one wealth manager in Switzerland, EMEA and APAC. In these regions, our invested assets have grown by at least 50% due to the acquisition, the equivalent of a decade of growth. In the Americas, we are a top player in the U.S. and are number one in Latin America. The acquisition is also reinforcing our position as the number one universal bank in Switzerland. This is not a function of our size or market share, but the clear result of the value we bring to our clients through our one-firm approach, expertise and global reach that is particularly important to our large corporate and small and medium enterprise clients. With $1.6 trillion in invested assets, Asset Management has improved our competitiveness globally and expanded our presence in growth markets.
We have strengthened the value provided to clients through complementary products across key asset classes. In the Investment Bank, we are reinforcing our competitive position with our key clients. We will continue to build durable and profitable market share in the areas that differentiate UBS for our clients, while now deploying a smaller proportion of the Group’s financial resources compared to pre-acquisition levels. We finished 2023 with strong momentum in terms of our integration timeline. While we have full confidence in our ability to fulfil our goals, we are not complacent about the magnitude and complexity of the task ahead. Given the evident structural issues with Credit Suisse’s business model and lack of profitability, there is a significant amount of restructuring and optimization that must take place over the next three years before we can harvest the full benefits of the combination.
As we previously communicated during 2024 and 2025, we will incur substantial integration-related expenses as we materially restructure and remove duplication across our operations. The non-core and legacy portfolio will continue to be a meaningful drag on our results as it is actively unwound. In addition, over the next three years, Credit Suisse’s core businesses will also continue to require balance sheet optimization. While we will sacrifice some reported profitability and growth in the short-term, we are convinced this will improve the quality of our long-term growth trajectory and bring greater cost and capital efficiency. As a result, we are reiterating our targets to realize an underlying return on CET1 capital of around 15% and cost income ratio of less than 70% as we exit 2026.
As I’ve said before, 2024 is a pivotal year for UBS. We are taking a staged approach in our execution plan to minimize the risk of disruption for clients and employees. With over 6,000 deliverables over the next three years, the task is not as simple as the illustrative overview you see on slide 18. We expect to complete the merger of our parent banks and establish a single U.S. IHC by the end of the first half of the year. The merger of our Swiss entities should occur before the end of the third quarter. Completing these key milestones will allow us to realize the associated cost, capital and funding benefits. These significant legal entity mergers are a prerequisite for the first wave of client migrations and will allow us to begin streamlining and decommissioning legacy platforms in the second half of 2024.
This process will continue into 2025 before we begin the transition towards our target state in 2026. Again, I’m sure we all appreciate the significant costs associated with running and combining two GSIBs, including one that is still structurally unprofitable. This is why a pure integration cost journey is not enough. We also need to deeply restructure to get to an appropriate cost base. Therefore, the realization of our integration plans and the rundown of the non-core and legacy portfolio is expected to result in around $13 billion in gross cost reductions by the end of 2026. In addition to supporting our cost and calibration target, the decrease also provides us with the necessary capacity to enhance the resilience of our combined infrastructure.
It will also allow us to continue to drive enduring growth by investing in talent, products and services. We will focus on improving the client experience and lowering the cost to serve by leveraging our already leading technology proficiencies. Another key driver of value creation will come from improved use of our financial resources. Obviously, the most prominent example is the non-core and legacy portfolio, where we expect our wind-down efforts to result in a capital release of over $6 billion by the end of 2026. Of equal importance, we need to optimize the utilization of financial resources across the core businesses to improve returns on risk-weighted assets. As you can see on the slide, Credit Suisse’s capital efficiency and profitability were compromised in recent years by capital-intensive exposures, underpriced resources and products, and order rates that were not aligned to underlying risks.
While in the short-term it will be difficult to produce the best-in-class returns that UBS had previously, our aim is to narrow the gap in a reasonable timeframe. This will require repricing and/or exiting low returning exposures. We will also remain disciplined to ensure that pricing reflects the underlying risk and value of the advice, products and services we provide. As we do this, we will expect to capture gross inflows in GWM and P&C as we prioritize relationships where we provide more holistic client coverage. As I said, we assume that our actions to improve capital efficiency will result in a lower growth trajectory through 2025, a necessary trade-off to create long-term value. Now, moving to our medium-term priorities and ambitions for our business divisions, starting with GWM.
