Daniel Beck: Yes, Abraham. Good question. In the quarter, for example, we did billion dollars sale out of the Treasury portfolio for AFS to be very clear. And the rationale behind that is, we look at the payback period on that sale was roughly nine months. So that’s really the way for us to look at, from a tangible book value perspective, that payback period and opportunity. So I wouldn’t say there’s any desire for a wholesale change in the available for sale portfolio. But periodically with an opportunistic lens on payback period, we can do these small sales that — to some degree can be offset by warrant gains and things along those lines. So thinking about it from a tangible book value perspective, but at the same time, looking opportunistically at payback period.
Ebrahim Poonawala: Got it. Thanks for taking my questions.
Operator: Your next question comes from the line of Casey Haire with Jefferies. Your line is now open.
Casey Haire: Couple of questions on Slide 12. First off, so the non-interest-bearing mix, high 30s by fourth quarter ’23. That’s obviously very difficult to sort of handicap. Just what’s giving you confidence around that number.
Daniel Beck: Yes, Casey, it’s Dan, I’ll start. Mike wants to add as well. There are two things that we’re looking at that give us a little bit more confidence on where that non-interest-bearing mix is going to bottom-out. First and foremost, the teams have spent a lot more time getting into the detail across our different segments on where operating dollars lie versus excess dollars in these deposit accounts. So exactly how much from a deposit perspective is available to be transferred. Now that analysis is never perfect but allows to start to get a sense of where we think that non-interest-bearing piece is going to lie. And then secondly, when we take a big step back, we’ve talked about this before. And when you look at the total client funds of the company, and you start to think about non-interest-bearing bottoming out in the high 30% range.
And looking at the fact that total client funds is close to the $340 billion range, that high 30s is really when you compare it to other banks that don’t have off balance sheet in that, mid-teens to high-teens range, which we think no route relative to our historical experience is a bottom and is a low. So we’ve got the individual assessment that we’ve done plus just our historical experience, on where that would bottom-out, in comparison to peer banks. Now, it’s not perfect for sure. And we’re encouraged by the slowdown and the pace of that change here in the fourth quarter. And we expect that to continue throughout 2023.
Casey Haire: Very good, thank you. And then in the letter you guys talk about, you don’t need to see VC deployment returned to 2021 levels, which were obviously very strong. Can you provide some color as to why that is? Because that comes up a lot, because that was such obviously a monster year for deposits. And it’s obviously flowing out now. And so it makes sense, the push back that it’s going to be very hard to replace what was a banner year?
Daniel Beck: Yes, Casey. I’ll just go to the results of the fourth quarter as an indicator of why that statement makes sense. We’re looking at venture deployment in the quarter, 35 billion or so think of that is kind of an annualized run with 120 billion to 140 billion venture deployment in the quarter, from a balance sheet perspective on balance sheet. While we did see the decline in deposits, it was much lower than what we saw in the third quarter. And the reason for that gets to what Greg mentioned, as well as Mike, where we’re seeing that lower level of cash burn. So even on a much slower venture deployment number, call it in the mid $30 billion range, we started to see that on balance sheet deposit when we look at cash burn versus the inflows get to a much more normalized level.