So I think that €“ I think maybe the perception that €“ perception, if it was true, we would have had an awful 2022, okay? It would have been as awful. We had a really €“ across The Street, the Institutional was very difficult. Our business was down over 30%, yet we had our second best year ever and very good results because our model balances the stability of Wealth Management with the cyclical aspects of the Institutional business. We’ll focus on Wealth, we always have. We will also do accretive transactions in the Institutional space because we believe that’s a business, especially where we’re positioned as a middle-market firm and so many firms are exiting. They’re either not big enough to get there or they’re large enough, they’re focusing up.
There’s a huge market for us, and we’re going to take advantage of that.
James Marischen: I’d also reiterate one of Ron’s comments from the prepared remarks. We expect Wealth Management to comprise a greater percentage of our revenues in the years ahead. I think that’s indicative of the investments and the growth we expect to see occur in that segment.
Brennan Hawken: Yes. Appreciate sharing your thoughts on that. That’s helpful. Another thing to consider for you guys might be disclosing the net new asset figure in writing to that might help the other two that you flagged there to do that as well. So that might help. A couple just follow-up items, maybe probably for Jim. You just spoke to premium AM at $5 million tailwind. Where does that stand versus the prior cycle trough at this point? And as far as thinking about the NII guide, was there any specific rate assumptions that underpin that or deposit balance and balance expectation?
James Marischen: Yes. So the comment I made related to the $5 million impact on net interest income was specific to the mortgage portfolio. And basically, as rates rise, the duration extends and you have to recast your expected period of time in which those deferred origination costs are amortized. And so that kind of true-up or catch-up entry was kind of a onetime event, $5 million in the fourth quarter. Unless you see a dramatic change in rates from here forward, you wouldn’t expect that to change materially. In terms of forward rates, I think essentially, what we’re saying in our forecast is consistent with the Fed fund future curve. Almost everything we have on balance sheet is tied to the short end of the curve, and we’re just following Fed fund’s future expectations.
Brennan Hawken: Okay. Great. Yes. The $5 million that €“ I mean, that was just a premium amortization adjustment on the mortgage book, right? I just wanted to make sure.
James Marischen: So there’s origination costs, right? They get expensed over the life. So not a premium amortization, but so costs that we incurred to originate those loans that are now being cast over a longer period of time. It’s somewhat analogous to that premium amortization topic, but it’s just origination costs.
Brennan Hawken: Got it. Okay.
Operator: And our next question will come from Steven Chubak with Wolfe Research.
Ronald Kruszewski: You are back.
Michael Anagnostakis: Yes. It’s Michael on again. I just €“ I want to ask one quick follow-up on the balance sheet. Given some of the volatility on the long end and the forward curve implying Fed cuts in the back half, how is the thinking evolving around managing duration here? Is there any greater desire to remix the balance sheet to lock in some higher yields? Or is the strategy to remain predominantly geared to the short end? Thanks again.
