David Vélez: Sure, Pedro. Here’s David. So we, from the very beginning, built a strategy in credit card to focus on transactors. We never love the revolving business for the reasons that you know very well, which is a market that has a number of different complexities across the chain and ultimately forces issuers to charge very high interest rates. We never like that. And so, we’ve decided to build in the beginning a model that looked for transactors. And in fact, if we could have — since the beginning, we could have a model that had 100% transactor, 0% revolvers, we would choose that. We would make — we will effectively make money only on interchange. However, it’s impossible. The models are not perfect. And so you end up having a percentage of revolvers.
But they are kept to effectively the minimum and customers that come in and effectively have a higher probability of revolve, we wouldn’t accept them to be a credit card holder. And that’s why you see us having such a smaller percentage of revolver of 7% versus the average market at 16%. Now, we see that there are other opportunities to use financing that is good for the customer, where there is real price elasticity, and we can price at a much lower interest rate. And specifically in our case, fixed financing over the past few quarters has been great avenue where we allow customers to finance their purchases over a number of installments at lower and much lower interest rates creating this portfolio of much longer dated, lower delinquency, lower interest type of portfolio, which is ultimately much healthier for us and much better for customers.
So that is effectively the part that we want to grow. And so, that is what you effectively see in slide 14, where you see us growing that kind of interest-bearing balances from 8% to 19% while trying to maintain revolver to its minimum.
Jorg Friedemann: And our next question comes from the line of Eduardo Rosman, BTG Pactual.
Eduardo Rosman: Congrats on the numbers. I have a question related to the revolving credit card theme and these potential changes in [indiscernible]. What’s your take on that? Should we expect something relevant to happen? If there’s a cap, shouldn’t this be an opportunity for Nu given its much lower cost to serve? You also just mentioned that you have less revolving than peers. So any color here would be great.
Guilherme Lago: Rosman, this is Lago. Thanks for your question. So, the discussions around the economics of credit card in Brazil have been going on for years, and they have certainly intensified over the past few months, involving both the government and many credit card issuers. But those discussions are not simple because the topic is really highly complex. As you know, credit card represents a very big industry in Brazil. It accounts for about 40% of the personal consumption expenditure or PCE of the country and over 20% of the GDP of Brazil. In 2022, the purchase volume of credit cards accounted for over BRL 2 trillion. So, it’s a very important, very large industry and any drastic or material changes to its dynamics may have fairly relevant and material consequences to the economic output.
I think all of the industry participants, the government and the regulators are fully aware of this. And we are very confident that the industry will provide an adequate solution that we even evolve and further the product in a better equilibrium. I think it is very hard for us, Rosman, at this point in time to draw any high conviction outlook as to what is going to happen over the next few weeks or months. But we do not expect any drastic changes in the unit economics, nor do we actually believe that interest rate cap will be welcomed by many of the industry participants or the regulators given the material negative impact that it may have to the credit availability.
