If you — we talked extensively about the criteria we would use to evaluate any acquisition. And it was obviously financial accretion. It was obviously industrial logic. But a big component of that was to look for assets or opportunities that would also have a net positive effect on inventory life. And not just long-dated inventory, but inventory that can compete right now today, and that’s exactly what we’re seeing from the Ensign acquisition. So to the extent that we continue to screen and look at opportunities here in the U.S. And they — and we find some that meet that criteria. I will take a very hard look at that Pat and his team are constantly looking at the opportunities within our core basins. But if anything, Ensign has actually raised that bar and raise and elevated that criteria because it was so accretive to the overall enterprise and specifically the Eagle Ford metrics.
Douglas Leggate: I appreciate the answer, Lee. I mean, good assets and hands great management with a lot of cash and you can kind of see where I’m going with that. So thank you for the answer. My follow-up is kind of a similar question on EG. And you know we’ve been kind of struggling with this a little bit because I realize that the step change in the 18-year contract is extraordinary. The problem we’re facing is that on our numbers at least on third-party data, in particular, the $900 million of EBITDA more or less on the production, it looks like it’s about $600 million gross going through the plant. That production looks to decline about 70% over the next 5 years, and you don’t have any capital associated with the uplift this coming year.
So my question is, how do you maintain — what are the opportunities that in terms of whether it might require capital or third-party on that gas to spend capital, which brings questions over what kind of margin you can actually maintain on that. So I guess I’m looking for confirmation. Is that really the decline rate? And how do you backfill it?
Lee Tillman: Yes. Well, I think the — first of all, on the decline rate, on the equity Alba gas time and safe, we’re kind of 8% to 10% annual decline rate. So that’s kind of the decline rate that we would typically experience within that asset. In terms of future opportunities, let me describe it like this. First of all, as I said in my opening comments, we have this world-class very unique infrastructure sitting in 1 of the most gas prone areas of West Africa. And quite frankly, those molecules will not get monetized unless they probably flow through EG LNG. We are the route to monetization. And we’ve already demonstrated success in that. If you look at the Alen project, which, as you said, if you will, another molecule, a non-equity project.
But with that, we were able to participate both from a tolling as well as a percentage of proceeds on the profit sharing side of that. Not only that, but when you talk about capital, we had more infrastructure built out on someone else’s capital, i.e., the Alen pipeline. And that was obviously critical for the Alen project but it also subsequently now connects us to additional discovered undeveloped gas that we know ultimately will come to market. Remember, we’re in the Atlantic Basin, where transportation and geographically advantaged to European markets. There is no other monetization route for those molecules. So I have a very high confidence that between third-party opportunities as well as the fact that we continue to assess both on-block Alba and off block opportunities ourselves.
