And we’ve built a model where Strong Global Entertainment, through Strong Studios, can make fees that are similar to what I would call like asset management fees, where we’re getting — we call them production fees, right? We’re producing the product. And then we are getting fees that are similar to performance fees on an asset management product in that we own a percentage of the back end, right? So there’s — and the more of these that we build, the better, particularly when we’re doing it like an asset management-like model where we have — it’s an asset-light asset management model. We’re not betting tons of our money on this, we are betting some of our money on this. And to your question about whether it’s possible to unwind, we could unwind it.
But we think that we’ll be able to build this out to a nice business. Now if a year from now, we — a year or 2 years from now we say, “Hey, you know what? We’ve tried and it’s not working.” Then certainly, we’ll — or if the market changes — and the market has changed in the couple of years that we’ve been involved. So we’ve been adapting and changing to it. We’ve also, through Unbounded, acquired a business that has more recurring potential revenue because they do not only movies and documentaries, but they also do a lot of advertising content. So they’re creating content for companies that need advertising content. So that’s much more regular jobs, smaller jobs, regular jobs that can really build a nice steady stream of cash flow when you’re not — while you’re waiting for the big win, on something like Safehaven.
So I feel very good about that model. I think it’s very consistent with what we are doing in other businesses, where we are not deploying tons of our capital. And eventually, when — ideally when GreenFirst is sold or if GreenFirst is sold, we’ll have a lot more capital to do more of these types of things and/or buy our stock because we’ll still have to make a decision when that happens. So right now, I’m really pleased with the progress we’ve made in that business.
Bill Brewster: All right. I’m going to ask you one quick follow-up on GreenFirst and then I’ll drop in the queue, but I got a couple more if there’s no one after me. GreenFirst is obviously in the middle of the storm that the Fed is targeting real estate and lumber, obviously goes into real estate. But I’m curious, as you look at where the investment is today and given the sales of assets and the monetizations, how do you feel about the price paid for GreenFirst and using the FGH capital to purchase that asset given sort of how the facts have unwound? I’m curious, your thoughts of whether or not you’re still pleased with the transaction or whether or not you would have done something differently.
Todd Major: So we originally purchased GreenFirst when it was ITASCA. Actually before it was ITASCA Capital, it was called Quebec’s Capital and we bought it as a cash shell in Canada with the idea that we could do something interesting with it, not much different than a Canadian SPAC with no time line to do a deal. So it was a pretty attractive structure. But it didn’t have a promote like a SPAC and it didn’t have a deadline like a SPAC did. So there is — SPAC has a promote for the sponsors and it has typically a 12- to 24-month time period for which you can do a deal. This was different because we had a cash shell that had tax NOLs, that had the ability for us to look for something really interesting to do but we had time.
And — but we don’t have infinite time, because as time went on, we started to get impatient and wanted our capital back. So we invested originally in the — like at a much lower price than the current stock price. And when the opportunity to do the deal with Paul Rivett came along, we jumped on it and thought it was a really good opportunity. The question might then follow and say, was it a good use of capital to exercise the shareholder rights that we are given as part of the transaction to acquire those assets from Rayonier. And if you remember back then, we were under tremendous amounts of pressure to exercise all of them. And in fact, we were like chastised for not exercising all of them by our shareholders. Like they were angry that we didn’t exercise every single one of them.
How could you do this? It was like we had — so I recused myself from that decision to let the Board make the decision because I knew it was going to be a controversial decision. And I wanted the Board to have insight into that, particularly since I was on the Board of GreenFirst. And I wanted to make sure it was a purely independent decision that was made. So they made the decision that they made, which was to exercise part of the rights but not all of them. There was a period of time where that was a great decision. And I left the Board of GreenFirst shortly after that to — I thought that I had done what I was put on the Board to do, which was find a deal, close the deal and then let the operators of that company thrive. I — as an investor in the company, I’ve certainly been involved in looking and trying to help the company find ways to monetize because we want to monetize our position at some point, obviously.
